The documents refer to an important and sensitive period of time in Yemen that paved the outbreak of the war in 2015, and the documents also dealt with files that are still open until now, and showed the position of the Saudi government of forces and figures calling for the secession of the south, and from reconsidering the support of the tribes, and their lack of action to stop the Houthis from storming Sanaa Despite the Saudi intelligence recommendation to do so.
These leaks shed light on the real agenda of Saudi Arabia, especially after last week it presented an updated version of the Riyadh agreement between the legitimate government and the Southern Transitional Council – supported by the UAE – and an attempt to portray this agreement as an achievement.
The leaked documents confirm the Kingdom’s dedication since the end of 2011 to several policies that pushed Yemen to reach its current status.
The documents relate to several dangerous files, the most important of which are:
The documents revealed that Saudi Arabia was dealing with the separation of southern Yemen as one of the main options for resolving what it describes as the “issue of the south”, in addition to offering the possible federal option phased out, and that it was trying to exploit the situation and protests in the south to serve only its interests.
It has sought to support and attract several southern entities away from the flag of the Yemeni state, and has recruited some southern leaders to monitor the movements and positions of each party in the south in exchange for providing them with material support, as indicated in a document issued number (17146) on the date of 2/15/1433 for migration (corresponding to 1/1/2012) from the Office of the Minister of Interior.
The documents also showed that Saudi Arabia had instructed to spy on the meetings of the southerners that were carried out under international sponsorship, and that it had recruited some of those present to raise reports and write what each party proposed.
The documents indicate that some southern forces that were seeking to secede succeeded after the signing of the Gulf initiative in 2011 in obtaining substantial Saudi support under the pretext of fighting what Saudi Arabia described as the Iranian incursion into southern Yemen, and all of this was done in contrast to what Riyadh was declaring of support for the Yemeni government and its territorial integrity .
The documents clearly reveal that Saudi Arabia’s strategy in Yemen is based on dismantling the country by supporting the various entities, not the state, to ensure that these tribal and political entities remain as a force of pressure and influence parallel to the power and influence of the Yemeni state, while inciting some of these forces to confront other forces, in order to achieve the Kingdom’s interests over Yemen account.
A document entitled “Very Confidentially .. Minutes of the meeting of the Committee for the Review of Yemeni Sheikhs Appropriations” issued by the Office of the Assistant Minister of Interior for Security Affairs, shows a constant endeavor to devote the authority of the tribe by providing material support to some sheikhs in exchange for ensuring that they implement the agendas and policies of Riyadh, and that the amount of support for the sheikhs of these tribes determines According to the importance of each tribe and the extent of the commitment of its elders to implement the directions and instructions received by them, away from the authority of the Yemeni state.
Moreover, she was The Kingdom ignores support requests that were received from the Yemeni authorities represented at that time by President Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi and then Prime Minister Muhammad Basandwa, while large sums were spent by tribal sheikhs as personal grants to them, and grants to implement some projects in their areas to ensure the loyalty of members of the tribe.
According to the documents, Saudi Arabia recruited a number of tribes to fight tribes and other entities that they considered to be anti-Saudi, and sought to ensure that those tribes implemented the Saudi agenda away from the sovereignty and authority of the Yemeni state.
Secret documents show that Riyadh was communicating directly with the tribal sheikhs to manage and implement individual operations outside the authority of the legitimate government, although the Saudi authorities could coordinate through the authority of the Yemeni state, but they were keen to fragment the state’s authority by strengthening the tribal’s fork and supporting it with money and arms .
The documents included a letter classified as “highly classified” on 29 Safar 1431 AH (corresponding to the year 2010 AD) by the King of Saudi Arabia at the time, Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz, instructing to provide an amount of 50 million riyals (about 13 million dollars) to support and arm the Yemeni tribes loyal to the Kingdom In the areas bordering the Saudi border, and seeking to ensure their loyalty.
In a telegram dated 19 Ramadan 1433 AH (corresponding to the year 2012 AD) by the Chargé d’Affaires of the Saudi Council of Ministers to the Crown Prince, the author of the message refers to a senior tribal sheikh in Yemen and his visit to the Kingdom, and the money allocated to him by the Saudi government.
The Saudi official said, “The honorable high directive was issued last year to suspend the monthly allocations for senior Sheikhs based on the intervention of the former Yemeni president, and then directed His Royal Highness Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz, may God have mercy on him, to spend annual aid to those who visit the Kingdom.”
The telegram adds that this visiting Sheikh was paid 1.5 million Saudi riyals in Ramadan last year, and that “your offer was made to your Highness with a proposal to exchange an amount similar to what was spent for him last year, and he will be handed over to him after you have overseen peace,” according to the text of the telegram.
In another telegram from the Saudi foreign minister at the time, Saud Al-Faisal, to the king on 25 Jumada al-Awwal 1433 AH (corresponding to 2012 AD), the minister acknowledges that the Kingdom’s relationship with Yemen was based on tribal elders without “a realistic assessment of their status and capabilities.”
He adds that the Saada war with the Houthis proved that “the influence of the sheikhs is modest, and that they were unable to protect the security and safety of the kingdom. Rather, they used the matter in coordination with the previous regime as a means of blackmail and obtaining funds.”
In his telegram, the minister called for changing the kingdom’s alliances inside Yemen, and opening up to civil society and parties, in light of the changes brought about by the Yemeni revolution.
The Houthi coup dossier
The documents show that Saudi Arabia was aware of all Houthi movements more than two years before they seized control of the capital, Sanaa, more than two years ago, and its intelligence reports monitored the Houthis’ intention and plans to control Sanaa with the support of the late President Ali Abdullah Saleh, but it did not lift a finger, and left the Houthi and Saleh militias to advance and topple the government Legitimacy.
A report submitted by the head of Saudi intelligence in March 2012 revealed all the Houthi movements and areas of their control, weapons storage sites, smuggling routes, Saleh’s role in supporting the Houthis to take control of Sana’a, and the sums spent to Houthi leaders to finance the move.
The documents show that the Saudi government ignored the intelligence chief’s recommendation that it was necessary to act to prevent the Houthis early from progress, and left them arriving in Sanaa, so that there would be a justification for waging war, destroying the Yemeni state and imposing direct military intervention there.
In other files, the documents revealed Saudi Arabia’s obstruction of any efforts to rebuild the city of Saada after the signing of the Gulf initiative and the end of the six wars, including attempts to obstruct German and Qatari support that were provided for the reconstruction of Saada as a contribution to resolving the Yemeni government’s conflict with the Houthis at the time, which contributed to the aggravation and expansion of the conflict.
Hadi and Saudi Arabia
One of the documents indicated that President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi asked for an amount of 30 million Saudi riyals (about 8 million dollars) to support him in the 2012 elections following Ali Saleh’s abdication of power, but Ali bin Abdul Aziz al-Khudairi, the Chargé d’Affairs of the Special Committee appointed by the Saudi Cabinet, wrote in The document addressed to the Assistant Minister of the Interior for Security Affairs that the support that Hadi is requesting is personal support and not to finance the elections, as he is the only consensual candidate, and Al-Khudairi suggested in his telegram that he support Hadi with only a million dollars.
The documents also showed the accusation of Yemen’s Vice President Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar of the ambiguity of his stance towards Saudi Arabia and the seriousness of his loyalty to Riyadh.
on the other side, Saudi Arabia has sought to recruit and buy journalists in Yemen, as indicated by a document issued No. (598/33) on 3/23/1433 for migration (corresponding to 2/15/2012), in addition to searching for leaders loyal to it in the cities of Taiz and Ibb to implement from During their agenda, given that the two governorates represent the largest population bloc in Yemen, and the Kingdom’s presence in them is weak.
A document number (7/2/1) dated 4/19/1433 (corresponding to 12/3/2012) stated that the Kingdom was aware of the late President Saleh’s facilitation of al-Qaeda’s control of southern areas through the region’s commander there, Mahdi Maqoula, and yet it continued In providing political cover for Saleh through the Gulf initiative.