What is new in these documents is that it places before the reader, who used to not bother to investigate and research the sabotaged Saudi role in Yemen, specific information about this intervention, usually scattered in articles and dialogues of experts and observers on the Yemeni affairs.
The files dealt with in these documents, most of which date back to the year 2015, are files that are still open until now, and show the extent to which Saudi policy has reached towards Yemen and based on the “principle” of interference, rejecting every move or voice that may appear in Yemen and calling for the independence of the Yemeni decision And his lack of affiliation with Saudi Arabia, which led in the end to launching the enemy against Yemen after the money lost its charm over the vast majority of the Yemeni people.
The division of Yemen
As we said elsewhere, and we repeat it here, that the main goal that Saudi Arabia seeks to achieve in Yemen is its division, and this fact that was absent from some, the Saudi documents revealed very clearly, as the documents revealed that Saudi Arabia dealt with the issue of the secession of southern Yemen, as one of the basic options To solve what it calls the “South issue”, besides offering the possible federal option phased out.
– Devoting the principle of loyalty to the tribe at the expense of the state and dismantling its structure
The documents also revealed clearly that Saudi Arabia’s strategy in Yemen is based on dismantling Yemen by supporting non-governmental entities, to ensure that these tribal and political entities remain as a pressure and power force parallel to the government’s power, while inciting some of those forces to confront other forces, in a way that achieves Saudi interests at the expense of Yemen .
Among the documents is a letter classified as “highly classified,” written by the king of Saudi Arabia at the time, Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz, in which he was instructed to provide about $ 13 million to support and arm Yemeni tribes loyal to the kingdom in areas bordering the Saudi borders, and to seek to ensure their loyalty.
– Saudi policy towards Yemen based on money and the purchase of receivables
In another telegram from the Saudi foreign minister at the time, Saud Al-Faisal, to King Abdullah, he admits that Saudi Arabia’s relationship with Yemen was based on tribal elders without a realistic assessment of their status and capabilities, and that the Sa’dah war with Ansar Allah demonstrated that the influence of the sheikhs was modest, and that they were unable to protect Saudi security and safety, and called for changing Saudi alliances inside Yemen.
Attitudes that reflect blind sectarian hatred
The documents revealed that Saudi Arabia hindered any efforts to rebuild the city of Saada after the signing of the Gulf initiative and the end of the six wars, including attempts to block German and Qatari support that was provided for the reconstruction of Saada as a contribution to resolving the Yemeni government’s conflict with Ansar Allah at the time, which contributed to the aggravation and expansion of the conflict.
Money is the basis of the relationship with Hadi, Al Qaeda, Saleh, and the sellers of the word honor
One of the documents revealed that Saudi Arabia granted Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi a million dollars to support him in the 2012 elections following Ali Saleh’s abdication of power, and also sought to recruit and buy journalists in Yemen, and was aware of Saleh’s facilitation of al-Qaeda’s control of southern areas, yet continued to provide Political cover for Saleh through the Gulf initiative.
What these documents revealed is open from the beginning, as the Saudi regime deals with Yemen in light of the will of the founding king Abdulaziz Al Saud, in which he warned his sons of a strong Yemen presence next to them, and he said his famous saying as quoted by historical sources: “Ezz the Saudis are in the humiliation of Yemen, Humiliate them in the glory of Yemen, “and it appears that the grandson, Ibn Salman, has defeated the king’s sons in complying with this command.